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THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA
APPELATE COURTS FOR
THE 1962-1963 TERM*
A Symposium
PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
C. Jerre Lloydf
SEPARATION AND DIVORCE
In Poitevent v. Poitevent' the wife scaled the wall of a men-
tal hospital in New Orleans, pawned her jewelry, bought a bus
ticket to Los Angeles, and telephoned her husband from Texas
that she was leaving him and the children for their own good.
(She had been under psychiatric treatment for several years.)
She then returned to her parents' home in New Orleans. Her
husband obtained a default decree of divorce on the ground of
abandonment and was awarded custody of the children, three
boys aged ten through fifteen. The wife later sought to obtain
custody of the children and have the default judgment annulled,
contending that her husband's failure to reveal to the trial court
that her alleged abandonment began with her escape from a
mental hospital constituted fraud.2 Not so, held the court of ap-
peal. Her actions on the day she escaped proved she was quite
competent, and her husband could hardly have been guilty of
fraud in failing to disclose them. But, contended the wife, the
judgment was defective in form, since it was rendered against
her while she was a mental incompetent 8 No, ruled the court;
*The Symposium covers work in the appellate courts from July 1, 1962, to
June 30, 1963.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 152 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, no error of law
in the judgment complained of, 244 La. 672, 153 So. 2d 884 (1963).
2. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2004 (1960): "A final judgment ob-
tained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled. ...
3. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2002 (1960) : "A final judgment shall
be annulled if it is rendered: (1) Against an incompetent person not represented
as required by law. ...
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psychiatric treatment alone is no evidence of mental incompe-
tence. Besides, she had acquiesced in the judgment by negotiat-
ing a voluntary property settlement with her husband three
months after it was rendered.4 In short, during the entire period
of time she was quite sane and capable of pursuing a rational
course of action. Might she then obtain custody of her three
sons? No, held the court of appeal. Not having to care for them
had improved her mental condition so much that to award her
custody of them might cause a relapse. 5
Both husband and wife sought a separation on the ground of
cruel treatment6 in Addison v. Addison.7 The husband had in-
flicted a small cut upon his stepson, and the wife contended this
act against her son was cruel treatment of her. The court of
appeal held this was not so, pointing out that the wound had
been inflicted during a general family melee in which a knife,
iron, and shotgun were employed at various times, and besides,
the stepson outweighed the father by twenty-five pounds. Also
dismissed was the husband's suit, in which he had claimed his
wife treated him cruelly by attempting to have him committed
for psychiatric observation. This decision reflects a commend-
able reluctance by the court of appeal to concretize a family
squabble, even one of rather extraordinary proportions, into a
judicial separation.
ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
Louisiana Civil Code article 160 provides that a wife in
necessitous circumstances may be awarded alimony either (1)
if she herself obtains the divorce, or (2) if her husband obtains
it on the ground of living separate and apart.8 The article speci-
4. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2003 (1960): "A defendant who
voluntarily acquiesced in the judgment ...may not annul the judgment on any
of the grounds enumerated in Article 2002."
5. "There was only one catch . . . and that was Catch-22." Dedication in
HELLER, CATcH-22 (1961).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 138 (1870) : "Separation from bed and board may be
claimed reciprocally for the following causes: . . . 3. On account of habitual intem-
perance of one of the married persons, or excesses, cruel treatement . . .if such
• ..ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupport-
able. ...
7. 149 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 160 (1870) : "If the wife who has obtained the divorce
has not sufficient means for her maintenance, the Court may allow her in its
discretion, out of the property and earnings of her husband, alimony which shall
not exceed one-third of his income; provided, however, that in cases where, under
the laws of this State a divorce is granted solely on the ground that the married
persons have been living separate and apart for a certain specified period of
time, and the husband has obtained a divorce upon the ground of such living
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fies that in the second situation she must show she was not at
fault, but no such requirement is made for situation (1), even
though the wife herself may be suing for divorce on the basis
of separation. Where she has lived apart from her husband two
years,9 therefore, it would be to her advantage to get service of
her divorce action first, since she would not, according to the
terms of article 160, be required to show she was without fault
in order to receive alimony. In Sachse v. Sachse'0 the wife at-
tempted just that, but the trial court denied her alimony any-
way, holding that whether a wife is plaintiff or defendant in a
divorce suit based on separation she must show herself free of
fault. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, disapprov-
ing a Third Circuit case decided earlier in the term, Moreau v.
Moreau." The court in Moreau had simply applied article 160
as written, stating that a wife need not show herself free of
fault when she is plaintiff in a divorce suit, even if the suit is
grounded on separation. Certainly the Moreau decision cannot
be criticized for applying article 160 precisely as it is written,
but the rule of the Sachse case is more equitable. As long as ar-
ticle 160 does place the burden of showing she is without fault
upon the wife who is defendant in a divorce action based on
separation, there is no reason why she should not bear the bur-
den when she is plaintiff.1 2
In Jefferson v. Jefferson's a sixteen-year-old married wom-
an, living separate from her husband but not judicially separ-
ated from him, sought a judgment against her absentee hus-
band's parents for the support of her minor child. The hus-
band's parents excepted to the plaintiff's procedural capacity,
but their exception was overruled on the holding that a married
separate and apart, and the wife has not been at fault, then the Court may allow
the wife in its discretion, out of the property and earnings of her husband, ali-
mony which shall not exceed one-third of his income ... "
9. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950) : "When the spouses have been living separate and
apart continuously for a period of two years or more, either spouse may sue for
and obtain a judgment of absolute divorce."
10. 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), noted infra in this issue at 24
LA. L. REv. 410 (1964).
11. 142 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
12. Brief note should be made of another interesting alimony case decided
during the last term, Roberts v. Roberts, 145 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962),
in which a wife's alimony was calculated by multiplying her equity in certain
property by four and one-half per cent (according to the court, its theoretical
income) and substracting that from one-third of the husband's income.
13. 145 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), certiorari on other grounds was
granted and the case remanded, 244 La. 493, 153 So. 2d 368 (1963). For the
opinion on remand, see Jefferson v. Jefferson, 154 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963).
[Vol. XXIV
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woman under eighteen does not need authorization or the assist-
ance of a curator in any type of suit. Since her husband was an
absentee, held the court, she had the powers of a tutor and was
authorized to bring the action for support against her child's
grandparents.
DISAVOWAL OF PATERNITY
The presumption that the husband of the mother is the father
of the child 14 is one of the strongest in Louisiana law, and Trahan
v. Trahan15 certainly does not weaken it. There the husband
was held to have lived separate and apart from his wife enough
to allow him a judicial separation, 6 but not enough to allow him
to disavow a child conceived during that time. The testimony
of both spouses and all the witnesses agreed that he could not
have fathered the child, and in fact when it was born his wife
had registered its father as "unknown." But the evidence was
held not to fit the requirements of Civil Code articles 185
through 192, and indeed the court of appeal in arriving at this
conclusion was merely following the directives of the Supreme
Court.' 7 It is, then, practically impossible to disavow a child.
The fundamental wisdom of such strictness is probably based on
a frank recognition of the human male's tendency to seek pro-
creative activity without accepting responsibility for its results.
Once a man has contracted marriage, the law holds him strictly
accountable for its progeny. But of course this principle, excel-
lent in itself, presupposes a legal system where marriage itself
cannot be dissolved through separation in fact. In a case like
Trahan, where a man is allowed to procure a legal separation on
the ground of separation, then forced to support a child fathered
by somebody else during that separation, the results are clearly
inequitable. But they will continue to occur until we arrive at
some consistent philosophy of what we wish a family to be, and
readjust our law accordingly.
CUSTODY
After separation or divorce of the parents, the custody of
14. LA. CIVir CODE art. 184 (1870) : "The law considers the husband of the
mother as the father of all children conceived during the marriage."
15. 142 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
16. LA. CIrvi CODE art. 138 (1870): "Separation from bed and board may
be claimed reciprocally for the following causes: . . . 9. When the husband and
wife have voluntarily lived separate and apart for one year and no reconciliation
has taken place during that time."
17. Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
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small children is usually given to the mother, but may be given
to the father if the mother is morally or otherwise unsuitable to
care for them properly.' Even if the mother can later show
she has removed the disabilities which caused the court initially
to refuse her custody, the court is sometimes reluctant to break
up a situation where the children are being adequately cared for
by the father; in these cases the trial court's discretion in allow-
ing the father to retain custody has been upheld with the state-
ment that the mother has not borne her double burden of proof:
that she is now fit for the children's custody, and that the father,
because of changed conditions, no longer is.19 The court of ap-
peal may disagree with the trial court's refusal to shift custody
to the mother, however, reversing and basing its holding on the
primary rule that the custody of young children is best given to
the mother.20 Gary v. Gary,2' decided this past term, covered the
last possible situation. There the trial court had shifted custody
to the mother, but was reversed, the court of appeal holding that
the mother had failed to sustain her double burden of proof.
Perhaps these cases seem to contradict one another, but actually
they are quite workable within the Louisiana system of review
of facts in civil cases. The trial courts may award custody to
either the father or mother initially, depending on the best in-
terests of the child, with due regard to the general principle
that young children are best given to the mother who is fit to
care for them. If, initially, she is not judged fit and custody is
given to the father, the trial court may later shift custody to
the mother or allow it to remain with the father, depending on
the facts of the matter. This is possible because of the viability
of the two appellate rules: that custody is best given to the fit
mother, but, if given to the father, need not be disturbed unless
the situation has changed sufficiently to require it.
It is interesting that the same circuit which decided the Gary
case, discussed above, reached an opposite result later in the
same term, but by different means. In Douglas v. Douglas22 a
mother sought custody of a child previously given to the father,
but the trial court refused her request, holding she had not met
her double burden of proof. The court of appeal reversed. By
18. See Tullier v. Tullier, 140 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
19. Hanks v. Hanks, 138 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962) ; Gentry v.
Gentry, 136 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
20. Tullier v. Tullier, 140 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
21. 143 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). Judges Hood and Tate dissented.
22. 146 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. XXIV
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finding that the father's judgment of separation and initial cus-
tody order for the child were nullities due to lack of jurisdiction
in the trial court, the court of appeal was able to consider the
custody question as if no award had been made, and applied the
rule that initially the mother should be awarded custody of small
children.23
Reeves v. Reeves2 4 involved a contest for custody of a four-
teen-year-old boy, who had been in the custody of his mother
since the parents were divorced ten years before. After a visit
to his father, the boy refused to return to his mother, and the
father was allowed to keep him. The court of appeal upheld the
decision, indicating its awareness of the value of a father's guid-
ance to the boy, who had been having trouble with school and
the juvenile authorities.
In Sachse v. Sachse25 the trial court granted custody of the
minor child of divorced parents to the mother, specifying in de-
tail certain short periods when the child might be removed from
the court's jurisdiction, and otherwise forbidding such removal
without further court authorization. Recognizing its decision as
one of first impression in Louisiana, the First Circuit cited the
majority view of other jurisdictions in upholding the right of
the trial court to thus restrict custody.
PUTATIVE MARRIAGE
The claim of a woman seeking to be declared the putative
wife of the decedent was rejected by the court of appeal in
Succession of Davis.26 The administratrix of the succession, an
aunt of the decedent, introduced evidence of two prior undis-
solved marriages of the woman, at which time, the court of
appeal concluded, any presumption that the woman was in good
faith disappeared. Her testimony that she was ignorant of the
necessity of dissolving a prior marriage before a new one could
be legally contracted was disbelieved by the trial court, and the
court of appeal did not disturb this finding.
CONCUBINAGE
In Chambers v. Crawford"' a former concubine sought to be
23. There were no dissents in this case.
24. 150 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
25. 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
26. 142 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
27. 150 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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declared owner of an undivided one-half interest in a house
and lot purchased by her erstwhile paramour during, and in
promotion of, their open concubinage, but later abandoned to
her. The court of appeal denied her claim, since there was no
evidence she had contributed to the purchase of the property
with funds derived from any source other than the concubinage
itself. While refusing to elevate the status of open concubinage
to the level of a "partnership" from which joint property rights
might flow, the court did allow the concubine recovery of sums
expended on the property after her paramour had left and the
concubinage had come to an end. Had the property been pur-
chased in her name as well as his, and had there been an in-
dication she had contributed to its purchase with funds derived
from enterprises other than living as his concubine, the court
might also have considered her claim for half-ownership meri-
torious.2 8 The case illustrates both the reluctance of the judi-
ciary to allow persons living in open concubinage to derive any
property rights from that status, but also reflects its desire to
see that their property rights as separate individuals are pro-
tected.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The defendant in Escort v. Lafargue,29 a suit to establish
paternity, contended that a notarial act in which he had pur-
portedly acknowledged the children in question was insufficient
in that it did not contain all the formalities required for au-
thentic acts by Civil Code article 2234.30 The court of appeal
rejected the argument, holding that Civil Code article 203, which
provides for acknowledgment by notarial act, requires only a
declaration executed before a notary and two witnesses.
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
Two cases during the past term reaffirmed the rule that
only legitimate relatives may recover for wrongful death under
Civil Code article 2315.31 The Second Circuit, in Buie v. Hester,3 2
28. The court discusses such cases in its opinion, id. at 63.
29. 142 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
30. "The authentic act, as relates to contracts, is that which has been executed
before a notary public or other officer authorized to execute such functions, in
presence of two witnesses, aged at least fourteen years, or of three witnesses,
if a party be blind. If a party does not know how to sign, the notary must
cause him to affix his mark to the instrument. .. "
31. See Cheeks v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of New York, 87 So. 2d 377 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1956).
32. 147 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. XXIV
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held that a mother and father whose marriage was putative
could not recover for the death of their child. In Scott v. La
Fontaine33 a mother sought recovery for the death of her
illegitimate son, attempting to legitimate him posthumously by
notarial act.34 The trial court dismissed her suit and the court
of appeal affirmed, holding that under the terms of Civil Code
article 201, posthumous legitimation is possible only when the
deceased child itself has left issue.3 5 That, indeed, is what Civil
Code article 201 provides, and the decision of the court can
scarcely be called in question for applying it. Yet there were
strong equities in favor of not dismissing the mother's suit,
since she had raised her son as if he were legitimate for sixteen
years,8 6 and had undoubtedly not even been aware of the process
of legitimation until informed of its existence by the attorney
handling her claim.37 Probably what is needed here is a re-
examination of the basic rule that illegitimate relatives may
not recover for death under article 2315. Certainly where they
have lived together, their loss after a relative's death is no less
than it would be if the relationship had been legitimate.
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
The necessity for at least one party to a divorce action's
being domiciled in Louisiana under the terms of Code of Civil
Procedure article 10(7)38 was underscored in three cases last
term. In Thomas v. Thomas3 9 a domiciliary of New York was
denied the right to sue his California-domiciled wife in Orleans
Parish, even though the latter had been the last matrimonial
domicile. The divorce suits brought by service men stationed
in Louisiana were dismissed in both Shockey v. Shockey 40 and
Fresolone v. O'Beirne.41 In Shockey the plaintiff testified he
33. 148 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), writ denied, no error of law in
the judgment complained of, 244 La. 144, 150 So. 2d 768 (1963).
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 200 (1870); LA. R.S. 9:391 (1950).
35. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 201 (1870) : "Legitimation may even be extended to
deceased children who have left issue, and in that case it inures to the benefit
of such issue."
36. Petition, article 4, Scott v. La Fontaine, # 1264, 29th Jud. Dist. Ct.,
Parish of St. John the Baptist.
37. The legitimation was attempted one month before suit was filed.
38. "A court . . . has jurisdiction of the following actions . . .: (7) An action
of divorce, or of separation from bed and board, if one or both of the spouses are
domiciled in this state and, except as otherwise provided by law, the grounds
therefor were committed or occurred in this state, or while the matrimonial domi-
cile was in this state."
39. 144 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
40. 149 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
41. 146 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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planned to settle in Louisiana after discharge, but was held not
to be a domiciliary anyway, since he owned no property here,
belonged to no church or civic club, and had in general per-
formed no acts indicating an intention to make Louisiana his
domicile. In Fresolone the serviceman who testified he intended
to retire here was also held not to be a domiciliary, since he
had never lived outside his army post, and did not have a car
registered here.
According to Kinchen v. Kinchen42 the defendant in a divorce
action may, according to the terms of Code of Civil Procedure
article 1061, reconvene for divorce on any grounds. This had
not been so under Code of Practice article 363; the court re-
jected cases decided under that article.
In Broussard v. Domingue48 the trial court's judgment of
separation cast against a husband domiciled in another state
was upheld by the court of appeal, but its award of alimony
pendente lite was annulled. It was held to be a money judgment
and hence unobtainable through service of process on an attor-
ney at law unless the absent defendant were actually domiciled
within the state.4 4
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
CLASSIFICATION
Public Property
According to the Civil Code classification, public property
comprises two kinds of things: (a) those which belong to a pub-
lic body and are not susceptible of private ownership, and (b)
those which belong to a public body but are susceptible of pri-
vate ownership.1  The authority for the distinction is in the
42. 147 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
43. 146 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
44. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE art. 6 (1960) : "Jurisdiction over the per-
son % the legal power and authority of the court to render a Dersonal judgment
against a party to an action or proceeding. This jurisdiction must be based
upon: . . . (2) The service of process on the attorney at law appointed by the
court to defend an action or proceeding brought against an absent or incompetent
defendant who is domiciled in this state. . ....
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 450-458 (1870).
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